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MARKET MAKER V AUTOMATED ORDER BOOK MARKETS: UK EVIDENCE
ABSTRACT
The London Stock Exchange operates two separate trading platforms for UK equities: an
automated limit order book (SETS) and a multiple dealer market (SEAQ).  This paper
examines the relative efficiency of the different market structures, by comparing the
spread experienced by traders in each market.
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INTRODUCTION
Market microstructure is a rapidly growing area of interest.  O’Hara (1995) defines
market microstructure as “the study of the process and outcomes of exchanging assets
under explicit trading rules”.  Madhavan (2000) proclaims the importance of the area and
its implications for “asset pricing, corporate finance, and international finance”.
Madhavan goes on to explain that “a central idea in the theory of market microstructure is
that asset prices need not equal full-information expectations of value because of a
variety of frictions.”
There are various definitions and interpretations of market efficiency such as
“security prices fully reflect all available information” (Fama, 1991) or that investors
“cannot hope to consistently beat the market” (Shiller, 2000).  For the purpose of this
paper, “efficiency” refers to the market microstructure.  Again, there are as many
definitions for this as there are for market efficiency.  We will define the measure of
efficiency as the trading cost incurred. 
There are several types of market structure.  The major stock markets are either
automated limit order books or dealer markets.  A simple trade on an automated limit
order book would involve market participants electronically entering a limit order,
defining an amount and a maximum/minimum price they are willing to buy/sell.  A
counterparty then issues a market order to sell/buy, and is automatically matched to the
limit order offering the best price.  In a dealer market, there are intermediaries or market
makers, willing to buy and sell at a given price for a given quantity.  Investors agree a
price and then trade with the market maker.  There may be one or many market makers
for a given stock.
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While there has been a global shift from floor trading markets to automated order
book markets, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that the latter is more efficient.
Previous studies have looked at the transaction costs of cross listed stocks (Forster et al,
1996), or a batch of matched stocks (Haung and Stoll, 1996).  The results are obscured by
the inherent differences between the markets in question.  Ideally we would like to
compare stocks from the same market, that use different trading platforms.
In 1996, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) introduced SETS (Stock Exchange
Trading System), an automated limit order book, for the FTSE 100 stocks.  Since then,
several of the FTSE 250 stocks have switched from SEAQ (Stock Exchange Automated
Quotations System) to SETS.  This makes possible a comparison of the trading costs to
be made for the FTSE 250 constituents which trade on the different systems.
Market Architecture
Market architecture describes the physical environment and processes encountered by
traders, along with the regulatory boundaries.  Madhavan (2000) names 5 distinct
characteristics of market architecture:
1. Market type (degree of continuity, reliance on market makers, degree of
automation)
2. Price discovery (the process of information filtering through to prices)
3. Types of orders permitted (e.g. limit orders contingent on market conditions)
4. Protocols (e.g rules about program trading, trading halts, opening and closing
procedures)
5. Transparency (pre and post trade, links between formal and informal markets).
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There are other features of a market that affect its efficiency, but these are often
harder to quantify.  For example, some stocks are traded on more than one market.  This
competition for order flow may affect the efficiency of each market.  The differences in
the competing markets may also affect the cross section of informed and uninformed
investors.  Similarly, access to the market is important, but rarely considered in academic
literature.  Subscription fees may be negligible for large investment houses, but they can
restrict access for private investors or smaller companies.  This introduces another level
of intermediation.  This may affect the efficiency of the market, and it will affect the
measures of efficiency, which ignores brokerage commission.
Much of the previous published research studies the NYSE (New York Stock
Exchange), for a number of reasons:  it is one of the most liquid markets in the world, it
provides a vast quantity of accurate data, and it is one of the few existing markets to have
specialist intermediation and a physical trading floor.  Venkataraman (2001) describes the
NYSE as an “order driven floor-based continuous market with specialist”.  However, like
many international markets, there are different ways to trade.  The NYSE is actually a
hybrid market.  Orders can be submitted to a floor broker or through SuperDOT to the
central limit order book.
SEAQ is one of the other trading platforms that rely on market makers.  The main
difference between SEAQ and the NYSE is that SEAQ has multiple market makers rather
than a designated specialist.  Both inventory models and information based models
assume that there is a single market maker, and so it is difficult to extrapolate the results
to the LSE.  It can be argued that competition from other market makers should make the
market more efficient.   However, regulators impose strict rules on NYSE specialist
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firms.  Specialists are punished for making too much profit, at the expense of providing
liquidity.
As mentioned above, SEAQ is a multiple market maker driven market.  Market
makers submit their best bid and offer prices to SEAQ, and brokers can view these quotes
on screen.  These quotes are firm, for trades up to the quoted size (usually the Normal
Market Size).  Before a trade is placed, brokers can phone a market maker to confirm a
price for a larger size or try to get a price improvement.
SETS is an electronic order book.  Liquidity is provided by any trader placing a
limit order onto the book.  Member firms can view a subsection of the order book (top ten
quotes on either side, and overall volume on each side), and post market orders or limit
orders of their own.  
Revealed Preference for Automated Limit Order Book Markets
Madhavan (2001) talks of the “revealed preference” of markets to switch to automated
auction markets.  Exchanges around the world have different ownership structures, e.g.
the NYSE is mutually owned by the member firms, whereas the LSE is owned by
shareholders.  Maximising profits for the exchange ownership, and improving efficiency
within the markets that the exchange provide, may not be entirely compatible objectives.
An exchange makes profits as a function of the number of trades and the size of the
transaction cost, the higher the better in both cases.  The efficiency of the market depends
on the same two variables, but the transaction cost should be minimised.  This is an
agency problem.  The “revealed preference” for exchanges to switch to automated order
books, is not evidence that these are more efficient market structures.
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Amihud et al (1997) discover large changes in asset values when stocks moved to
a more liquid trading system on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.  This could be a result of
stricter disclosure requirements, stricter regulation and so greater trust in the exchange,
quicker information flow, greater publicity or other reasons.  While we can say with
certainty that foreign investors are less disadvantaged by physical location with an
electronic limit order book rather than a physical floor trading market, we cannot
conclude from this that the market is necessarily more liquid in the former case.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Venkataraman (2001) compares an automated market (Paris Bourse) and a floor trading
market (NYSE).  He finds that the NYSE has lower transaction costs than the Paris
Bourse.  This paper uses a similar methodology, but does not make the same comparison.
Venkataraman compares an order book with a trading floor system.  This paper compares
an order book with a market maker system.  
Madhavan (2001) is not sure whether it is the existence of the trading floor or the
specialist, or simply human intermediation that causes the results that Venkataraman
reports.  Madhavan concludes that “these results suggest that the present form of the
automated trading system may not fully replicate the benefits of human intermediation on
a trading floor”.  However, he points out that many other aspects of the market structure
are different including “insider trading rules, macro risk factors and overall level of
market activity”.   
It is clear that we cannot simply test for “automation” versus “market maker”
when comparing different markets, because we are looking at the whole market
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microstructure. This includes the ease of trading, the ease of information flow, barriers to
entry into the market, experience of professionals in the industry, technological limits and
so on.  Many of these issues, however, are not relevant when comparing two trading
systems in the same market.
Previous work in this field examines the relative transaction costs of cross listed
securities (Forster et al, 1996).  There are many problems with this comparison as stocks
usually have a main listing with most of the trading occurring in that market.  The
research design was later revised to compare groups of matched stocks, where matching
is carried out with reference to “price, market capitalization and trading volume” (Haung
and Stoll, 1996).  While this allows for many of the previous criticisms, there are still
significant differences including investor profile, tax, and information flow.
Information Asymmetry
Harris (2002) spells out the logical sequence: “in real markets, some traders are better
informed than other traders.”  Well-informed traders trade quickly to profit from their
information.  Trades are made quickly by submitting market orders.  “The well-informed
traders subject the limit orders to adverse selection.” 
It is not clear what kind of “information” Harris is referring to.  Insider trading is
illegal in most markets.  Information is rapidly disseminated in developed markets.
Academics argue that a good analyst’s interpretation of publicly available data is itself
information.  Information can be split into internal and external categories.  Earnings
announcements and other published information is external information.  An analyst’s
valuation model is an example of internal information.  A market maker’s inventory level
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is another example of internal information.  Common interpretation may assume the
analysts to be informed but the market maker to be uninformed.  It should be noted that
the distinction of informed and uninformed traders and the interpretation of “information”
varies.
Harris lists several proxies for information asymmetry, including: information
disclosure rules, analysts, information vendors, diversified portfolios, age of firm and
insider trading rules.  Given that most of the information vendors and all of the disclosure
requirements are the same for SEAQ stocks and SETS stocks, there is no reason to
believe that the information asymmetry would be different for each group of stocks.
Theory often assumes that the specialist is an uninformed liquidity trader.  But
Madhavan and Smidt (1993) find that “the specialist appears to possess market
information unavailable to most traders; future order imbalances affect current price
quotations”.  On the LSE, market makers may not be privy to inside information, but they
do deal on their own account and frequently trade on information.  
It is usually assumed that traders are either informed or uninformed, rather than
having investors with varying levels of information.  Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and
Easley and O’Hara (1987) create models that separate traders into these two groups, but it
is not clear how their models are affected by the relaxation of this assumption.
Market Makers
Cao et al (1997) discuss the effect of competition among exchanges, and how this affects
the efficiency of a specialist in the NYSE.  A similar comparison could be drawn between
the competing market makers on the LSE.  Cao et al (1997) show that there is significant
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variation in the efficiency of different specialist firms.  Similarly UK market makers may
not be as efficient as each other or for that matter, as efficient as NYSE specialists.  
Inventory theory is based on a single market maker.  Stretching the conclusions to
allow for multiple market makers is not straightforward.  Neither is it easy to allow for
the numerous liquidity providers on an order book.  Grossman and Miller (1988) show
that increasing the number of market makers increases the depth of the market and so
increases liquidity, particularly around crashes and other anomalies.
Alternative methods of trading
Trading platforms face competition for order flow from other areas of the market (hybrid
markets), off the market (privately arranged trades and retail brokers) and rival
exchanges.  Traders may consider several factors when choosing how to trade, including
efficiency, transparency, cost, access, stability, security, familiarity and monetary
incentives.
Madhavan (2001) points out that Venkataraman (2001) looks at the trading floor
trades on the NYSE.  This ignores the fact that a large number of trades are placed
through the automated superDOT system.  Haung and Stoll (1996) compare a dealer
market (NASDAQ) with an auction market (NYSE).   This was the first cross market
comparison.  While Venkataraman (2001) uses the NYSE as a specialist market, Haung
and Stoll (1996) concentrate on the automated order routing of the NYSE through the
DOT (now SuperDOT) system.   Haung and Stoll (1996) match stocks by “price, the
market value of equity, the ratio of book to market value of equity, and leverage”.  They
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find that transaction costs are higher on NASDAQ than the NYSE, but NYSE is
characterized as a limit order book market in this comparison.
Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) also make “ a comparison of trade execution
costs for NYSE and NASDAQ-listed stocks”.  They show that the results of Haung and
Stoll (1996) also hold for small cap stocks.  Furthermore, they show that the higher
trading cost on NASDAQ is not attributable to adverse selection, as the average price
impact is similar or smaller than the NYSE sample.  This uses the price impact measure
which we discuss later.
Blume and Goldstein (1997) show that markets which compete with the NYSE
for a given stock, “attract a significant portion of their volume when they are posting
inferior bids and offers”.  They argue that some traders will follow the best price, but
some will trade by convenience, or familiarity, or by agreements such as “paying for
order flow”.
It is important to understand how the market affects the trading behaviour. Biais
et al (1995) look at the implications of trading in a transparent order book.  One result is
that investors place limit orders inside the spread when the depth is large, thus giving
them time priority over those that follow suit.  This behaviour skews the comparison of
efficiency, when using the bid offer spread as a measure.
Jong et al (1995) compare the Paris Bourse and SEAQ International.  They find
that quoted spreads are lower on Paris Bourse, but that this is clouded by differences in
depth.  They also show that although the spread on the Paris Bourse order book is wide
for large trades, actual transactions are cheaper on the Paris Bourse, presumably due to
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the active upstairs markets.  They also concede that “factors such as immediacy and
execution risk play a crucial role”.
Madhavan (1992) evaluates price discovery on a quote driven market and an order
driven market.  He shows mathematically that “ a quote-driven system provides greater
price efficiency than a continuous auction system.  However with free entry into market
making, the equilibria of the two mechanisms coincide”.  This gives us a priori estimates
that SETS and SEAQ should be equally efficient in terms of price discovery.  However,
Glosten (1994) finds that for a dealer market to compete with an order book, they must
offer something other than better price for a given size of trade.  This could be lack of
anonymity, or greater liquidity as a result of investors’ reluctance to switch markets.
Block Trades
Academics and professionals believe that large block trades are usually motivated by
liquidity rather than information.  The ability of investors to signal large liquidity based
trades has a knock on effect for the rest of the market.  It is important to establish whether
block trades occur on the central market and whether these trades are included in the
quoted statistics.
LaPlante and Muscarella (1997) compare NASDAQ with NYSE, concentrating
on block trades.  They look at “(1) frequency of the sizes and types of block trades found
in the two markets, (2) the immediate price effect of block transactions, and (3) the
temporary and permanent price effects of blocks”.  They find that larger block trades are
put through the NYSE, and that these incur lower losses (in terms of spread and
temporary price impact) than with NASDAQ.
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Haung and Stoll (1996) state that, “If one market structure is more efficient than
another in protecting against informed traders, its spread will not need to be as large”.
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) add that “upstairs intermediation reduces the marginal costs
of trading” and that the level of these costs depends on the reputation of the trader.  This
was first argued by Seppi (1990), saying that traders that can credibly signal liquidity
motivated trades, will receive improved quotes.
Degree of Continuity
Madhavan (1992) demonstrates that “a periodic trading mechanism can function where a
continuous market would fail”. Amihud and Mendelson (1987) compare “the opening
and closing transactions on the NYSE”. The opening is characterized as a clearing house
auction, while the closing is a continuous dealership market.  They find that the opening
prices are more volatile, rationalising that it is the trading mechanism that causes this
result.  However there are other timing differences, reporting requirements and
behavioural finance theories to explain this as well.  A comparison of SETS and SEAQ is
not subject to differences in degrees of continuity, other than the different rules and
processes surrounding trading halts.   Trading halts are rare and beyond the scope of this
paper.  The comparison in this paper benefits from having a similar degree of continuity
in both markets.
Pagano and Roell (1992) compare “auction and dealership markets”. Interestingly
they describe Paris Bourse as a hybrid trading platform, offering “a batch auction at the
beginning of the trading day” and “a continuous auction” for the rest of the trading day.  
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Biais et al (1999) also discuss the preopening period on the Paris Bourse.  10% of
trades occur as a result of the market opening procedure.  They conclude that “the
discipline provided by the occurrence of immediate trades is not necessary for markets to
reach informationally efficient outcomes.”  
Cao et al (2000) show that quotes with no firm commitment to trade (i.e. market
opening) do contain information for price discovery.  This is supported by Madhavan and
Panchapagesan (2000), who show the impact of the specialist during the opening period
on the NYSE.  However they qualify this by saying that a call market with specialist
intervention is not necessarily superior to a transparent call market, in which every
investor can see the order book, as is the case at the LSE opening for SETS stocks.
Spread and Depth
Measures of market spreads are discussed in detail in the next section.   The most
commonly used measure is the bid offer spread.  Theory shows that there are transient
and permanent components of the spread.  The transient component represents the fixed
cost of a transaction, and the permanent component allows for the risk of trading with an
informed trader.
Madhavan (2001) asks “who pays the spread?”  Liquidity providers benefit from a
wider spread.  Liquidity is provided by market makers and limit orders in each of the
different structures.  Since all investors have the option to place limit orders in an
automated order book market, it is not sensible to conclude that investors benefit from a
smaller spread in this market.  However, informed traders who wish to trade quickly do
benefit from a smaller spread.
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Venkataraman (2001) discusses the importance of tick size, and shows that when
the NYSE reduced the tick size for some of the stocks, the efficiency measures reduced
accordingly.  There are psychological theories surrounding the actual tick size, but the
more important issue is the ratio of tick size to share price.  The tick sizes are equal for all
FTSE 250 stocks, and so the proportional tick sizes can be matched by simply matching
the price of stocks.  However, SEAQ trades which occur as a result of a phone call may
include price improvements by something other than the tick size.  Conversations with
market makers suggest to me that price improvements are usually multiples of the tick
size, but this still introduces another reason why the efficiency measures may differ.
Kavajecz (1999) looks at “A specialist’s quoted depth and the limit order book”.
He describes how NYSE market makers must beat the spread to trade, because of the
priority rules.  Kavajecz (1999) also concludes that depths are used as a “strategic choice
variable by the specialist”.  Madhavan and Cheng (1997) argue that “liquidity is
characterized by its ability to absorb large trading volume without substantial price
movements.” This highlights the importance of depth in our measures of efficiency. 
 
MEASURES OF EFFICIENCY
As mentioned before, the bid offer spread is made up of permanent and transient
components.  The transient component reflects the return required for providing liquidity.
If we consider limit orders as contingent against a market maker, we could assume that
collectively, those that place limit orders will have greater overall overheads than a single
market maker.  We could then conclude that the transient component of the spread would
be higher for SETS.  However, this assumes that placing limit orders is profitable in the
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long run.  The permanent component of the bid offer spread depends on information
asymmetry.  The comparison of SETS and SEAQ is unaffected by many of the
determinants of information asymmetry.
Our measures of efficiency have been calculated in the same way as
Venkataraman (2001).  The first measure is:
Percentage Quoted Spreadit = 100 * (Offerit-Bidit) / Midit
Offerit  and Bidit  are the best offer and bid prices quoted by market makers on
SEAQ or the best bid and offer prices shown on the SETS limit order book for a given
stock (i) and trade (t).  Midit is the midpoint of the offer and bid prices.  
The quoted spread is averaged without weighting.  The rationale behind this
method is that we only care about the spread when trades take place. Other arguments
could be made, and Venkataraman (2001) uses a time weighted average.  However, the
limitations of this measure and the computational cost outweigh the gain from calculating
a time weighted average.  Further discussion follows in the next section.
Percentage Effective Spreadit = 200 * Dit * (Priceit – Midit) / Midit
Dit is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a buy order and –1 for a sell order.
Priceit is the transaction price.
Percentage Price Impactit = 200 * Dit * (Vi,t+n – Midit)) / Midit
Vi,t+n is the mid price at the time of the first trade more than n minutes after the
original trade.  For this comparison, we have taken n to be 30 minutes.  This measure was
included for completeness, although the validity of this statistic is discussed later.
Finally we calculate the Percentage Realized Spread.  Note that the realized
spread, less the effective spread, gives us the price impact.
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Percentage Realized Spreadit = 200 * Dit * (Priceit – Vi,t+n) / Midit
DATA
Data Source
The data set was obtained from the London Stock Exchange.  It includes details of the
best bid and offer prices quoted by SEAQ market makers and every limit order placed
onto the SETS order book. Each quote is time stamped to the nearest second.  A separate
data set records every trade with a time stamp to the nearest second, along with the
quantity, price, participant codes, and whether it was a buy or sell initiated trade.  These
two data sets have been combined to show the quoted spreads at the time of each trade.
Data Validation
Timing of trades is vital for the comparison and so trades reported late were also
excluded from the sample.  Inspection of the data also highlighted errors.  Occasionally
prices were typed with the decimal point in the wrong place, or the figures were reversed,
or the figures were simply implausible.  The incidence of obvious errors in the data were
small (less than 1%), and so they were simply deleted from the sample if:
1. A buy order occurred at more than 10% away from the market offer price.
2. A sell order occurred at more than 10% away from the market bid price.
While there is no official dealer market for SETS stocks, a significant proportion
of trades occur away from the order book.  These are trades organised with retail brokers
or transactions between brokerage firms.  Proportions of trade types are shown in Table
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1.  This paper compares the market makers and an automated order book, and so only the
trades on the order book have been included in the SETS sample.
This issue was addressed by Venkataraman (2001).  He states that on the NYSE,
only 5% of trades and 42% of the share volume go through the trading floor.  Madhavan
and Sofianos (1998) show that at the NYSE, specialists take part in 54.1% of trades in
illiquid stocks, but only 15.4% in liquid stocks.  In contrast, at the LSE, we find that the
proportion of automated trades increase with liquidity.  There are a number of
explanations for this.  The LSE statistic was calculated for trades in September 1998.  At
this time, the illiquid stocks (FTSE 250) had more recently swapped over to SETS.
Market participants have shown a reluctance to switch trading systems, and so a lower
proportion of trades went through the order book for the more recent additions to SETS.
SEAQ trades were matched up with the transaction reports, to identify the
presence of a market maker in the trade.  All trades with a market maker on one and only
one side of the trade were included.  
Matching
All FTSE 250 stocks trading on SETS at 1 September 1998 were matched with FTSE 250
stocks trading on SEAQ.  Certain stocks were excluded from the list of potential matches.
Companies that changed trading platform were excluded.  Companies that delisted, went
bankrupt, were taken over or merged during the period were excluded.  This was done to
simplify calculations.  There is no reason to believe that this introduces a bias.
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While the FTSE 250 constituents trading on SETS tend to be the larger
companies, it is possible to match pairs of companies using the same method as
Venkataraman (2001).  Venkataraman uses 4 different algorithms:
1. Price and Market Capitalization.
2. Price and Trading Volume.
3. Industry, Price and Market Capitalization.
4. Industry, Price and Trading Volume.
Trading Volume is calculated as the total trading volume reported to the exchange
throughout the period of review.  This includes the trades that occurred away from the
SETS order book, or the SEAQ market makers.   Trading volume in this context is a
proxy for liquidity, and so it is sensible to look at all methods of trading rather than the
subset of trades that we are concentrating on.
Market Capitalization is calculated at the start of the period of study.  Perhaps it
would be more appropriate to average market capitalization over the period, but the
opening figure is used, to be consistent with Venkataraman (2001).  This is unlikely to
make any significant difference to the results.
Matching by industry is harder for FTSE stocks than many other markets, as the
subdivision is much finer (by the FTSE Actuaries All Share classification).  Where
possible, we have matched stocks by sub sector, but if no stock was available, we have
used stocks from the same sector.  In a few cases, this has meant matching the likes of a
tobacco company with a health company.  The purpose of matching by industry is to
account for trends in demand.  While stocks in the same sector have similar
characteristics, there are reasons why share prices would move together, e.g. change in
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raw material cost, but also apart, e.g. one company signs an important contract.  Given
the matching errors already introduced, it is reasonable to allow this slight deviation from
the original research design.  One exception to this rule is that of financials:  investment
trusts were not matched against other financials, as these have very different performance
characteristics.
An Average Deviation statistic was calculated for each pair of stocks.  For the
first comparison, the average deviation is calculated as:
   [ [(Priceq - Pricet) / (Priceq + Pricet)] / 2  +  [(MCq - MCt) / (MCq + MCt)]  /  2 ]   / 2
where MC is the market capitailzation and the subscripts q and t refer to SEAQ and SETS
resepectively.  Each pair with an average deviation greater than 0.75, was excluded.
Haung and Stoll (1996) sum over the square of the characteristic deviation, rather than
simply sum, but we have used the method of Venkataraman (2001) for consistency.
Research Design
Having matched the stocks into appropriate pairs, we collate the two samples: SEAQ and
SETS.  Each of the efficiency measures is averaged over each month in the sample.  Each
of the trade dependent measures is subdivided into the size of the trade:
£50,000 < Very large
£10,000 < Large  < £50,000
£5,000 < Medium < £10,000
£1,000 < Small < £5,000
Very small < £1,000
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These data points were then averaged over the year, and averaged over each stock
for each of the samples.
RESULTS
The full table of results is shown in Table 3.  Overall the efficiency measures are higher
(less efficient) than the NYSE and the Paris Bourse. This is because we are looking at
less liquid stocks of the LSE.  Also worth noting is that the time period is different.
Chordia et al (2001) state that “effective spreads respond to equity market returns, recent
market trends and recent market volatility”.  
 Quoted Spread
The results show significantly higher quoted spreads on SEAQ.  This is the opposite
result to Venkataraman (2001).  However there are several reasons why the quoted spread
should not be used to compare SEAQ with SETS.  Firstly, there are always opportunities
for price improvement from SEAQ market makers, but what you see is what you get on
the limit order book.  Secondly, the quoted spread on SEAQ is usually quoted for normal
market size, while the spread on the limit order book could be quoted for any quantity.
For example, it is not uncommon for traders to front run the spread with small volume
quotes.  This would understate the “realistic” spread.  Thirdly, there is no generally
accepted method to cope with the fact that trades occur at different times than quote
revisions i.e. is it appropriate to evaluate the efficiency of trading with a measure that
doesn’t involve any aspect of a trade?  
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Effective Spread
Overall, the effective spreads are larger on SEAQ than on SETS, for each matching
algorithm.  This result contradicts Venkataraman (2001).  Based on these figures it would
appear that on the LSE, the order book is a more efficient trading platform.  
The difference is largest for small trades (£1,000 - £4,999) and decreases with
size.  For very large trades (> £50,000), transactions on SEAQ have a lower incurred
cost.  This can be rationalised by the proportion of investors trading through the order
book.  For SETS stocks, uninformed traders of large volume will take their business to
brokers off the market.  This is not the case for SEAQ stocks.  This means that on
average, we might expect large trades on the order book to contain more information than
large trades on SEAQ.
We have used the absolute size to categorize trades.  It could be argued that the
relative size is more important, i.e. we should compare the percentage of a company
being traded in any given transaction.  Two out of the four samples are matched using
market capitalization.  This makes an approximate allowance for the relative size of
trades, although the results will be weighted unevenly between stocks.  Market
capitalization varies from £79million to £3695million, for the sample matched on price
and market capitalization.  It is clear that a relatively large trade for the former and a
relatively small trade in the latter, may both be categorized as a medium trade on our
scale.  This approach was chosen for consistency with previous studies, but the
shortcomings should be noted.
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It is also worth noting that the trading mechanism may have an impact on trading
strategy.  Breaking a large trade into smaller chunks and spreading them over time, or
between market makers may be sensible on SEAQ, but there is no obvious advantage in
splitting orders when submitting to SETS.  This shouldn’t cause much of a problem to
our analysis as we have categorized the statistics by size of trade.  However, if
information content varies with size of trade, and the mechanism affects the trading
strategy, a bias will be introduced.
The figures vary between matching algorithms, particularly those that ignore the
industry of each firm.   However, the differences all have the same sign, and the trend by
size is observed for each method.
Price Impact
The results are mixed and volatile.  The price impact, for medium trades particularly,
varies across each sample.  In some cases, we see a negative price impact, i.e. a medium
sized buy order implies that the price will go down.  Ignoring the size of trade, the price
impact is always positive, and the price impact is always greater for SETS.  There are
several explanations and problems with these statistics. These are discussed below.
It is difficult to choose a time scale for this measure.  The shorter the time scale,
the bigger the impact of the size of the trade (informed trade or not), and the longer the
time scale the more information from other sources and trades.  I have used 30 minutes,
to be consistent with Venkataraman (2001).  Given that Venkataraman studies the most
liquid stocks on the Paris Bourse and the NYSE, and I am studying the less liquid FTSE
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250 stocks, it may be appropriate to use a longer time scale.  A market maker in a SEAQ
stock may decide not to change the spread for several hours. This may introduce a bias.
Venkataraman (2001) uses Price Impact as a measure of information content of a
trade.  This may not be appropriate.  Firstly investors with information are unlikely to
have information that will be leaked out and be fully reflected in the share price within 30
minutes.  Secondly, it is more useful to look at the other means of trading to ascertain the
level of information in the market.  Theory (or common sense) suggests that rational
investors would use an anonymous market, where available, to hide their trades.  This
implies that NYSE investors would route their orders through SuperDOT rather than
through a floor broker.  In Paris, uninformed block traders would use the upstairs market
to execute trades.  And so, intuition tells us that there should be a higher proportion of
information in the trades on the Paris Bourse.  This relies on two assumptions: there are
similar percentages of informed and uninformed investors in each market, and the market
microstructure is efficient enough, so as not to dissuade many informed investors.
Applying this logic to the LSE implies more information in SETS trades than SEAQ
trades.
Having qualified the use of these results, it appears that SEAQ is more efficient
than SETS on this measure.  The fact that SEAQ would be more efficient on one of the
four measures could mean a number of things:  the efficiency measure is inappropriate,
the results are biased in some way or the results are prone to random error.
It is possible that market makers are less concerned about updating quoted prices,
since most trades occur within the spread.  This would bias the result, as price
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improvements would be so long after the event that they would be more likely to include
information from other sources.
On the other side, market orders, which take liquidity from the market, may
automatically change the spread.  A large enough buy order (larger than the quoted depth)
will increase the spread immediately.  This does not dictate how other investors will
react, but it explains what the observed prices will do in the short term.
Realized Spread
This is the impact of the trade on the mid price over a thirty minute time period.  Haung
and Stoll (1996) use the difference between the realized spread and the effective spread
as a measure of adverse information.  Ignoring the difference in averaging, this is
effectively what the “price impact” measured in the previous section.  Again, the issues
described above, apply equally here.
We find that the realized spread is higher for SEAQ than SETS.  This may imply
that the impact of the effective spread is greater than the impact of the change in mid
price, but more likely it is a result of differences in the data between the two samples.
   
CHANGING FROM SEAQ TO SETS
Following a LSE review, it was decided to allow more FTSE 250 stocks to switch from
SEAQ to SETS on 6 September 1999.  SETS was intended for the more liquid stocks,
and there was an element of status associated with stocks added to this trading platform.
Amihud et al (1997) showed how stock prices jumped when introduced to a more liquid
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market structure.  For our comparison, we must evaluate whether the switch from SEAQ
to SETS added liquidity or not.
Research design
We look at the two year period 1 September 1998 to 31 August 2000.  We calculate each
of the efficiency measures for each stock, for each year. We split stocks into three groups:
those that switched on 6 September 1999, those that traded on SEAQ for the two year
period, and those that traded on SETS for the two year period.  There is no need to match
stocks in terms of market characteristics, as we are only comparing the change from year
one to year two, for each group.
Results
Despite the changes in market conditions, in particular the beginning of the bear period in
year two, we see that the efficiency measures for those stocks that did not switch platform
are relatively stable.  In contrast, the spreads calculated for those that did switch, do
change significantly.  The quoted spread increases considerably, but this is unlikely to be
a good indication.  The problems interpreting the price impact and realized spread apply
equally to this situation.  However, the increase in effective spread from year one to year
two cannot be explained by data manipulation problems.
The effective spreads for the two samples that did not involve a change in trading
platform, decrease from year one to year two.  In the case of the SETS stocks, the spread
decreases by 6 basis points.  In contrast, the effective spread for those that switched
increased by almost 7 basis points.  This may be explained by the proportion of informed
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trading in the market.  We might expect high volume, uninformed traders to trade away
from the limit order book, leaving a greater proportion of the informed traders trading in
the market.  This result may also be due to the reluctance of traders to use the new system
for these stocks.  This would artificially reduce the volume of trading in the central
market.  However, irrespective of the rationale, we have shown that stocks which
switched from SEAQ to SETS experienced an increases in transaction cost.  Given the
strong link between our definition of efficiency and most other definitions of liquidity,
this result implies that switching from SEAQ to SETS leads to an increased liquidity risk
premium, and a decrease in stock price.
This result provides as many questions as answers.  A further study could look at
the long term effects, by regressing the transaction costs on each stock, using the length
of time that the stock has been traded on SETS, and the length of time since SETS was
introduced.  This would measure the reluctance of traders to switch platform, and how
attitudes have changed over time.
A MEASURE OF INFORMATION CONTENT: INVESTMENT TRUSTS
Efficient markets rely on traders inferring information from trades.  One of the many
challenges faced by investors is to separate the effects of implied information and actual
information.  Similarly, it is difficult to measure the efficiency of a market by analysing
the effects of (so-called) informed trades on the price formation process.  As discussed
earlier, any measure that looks at the profitability of trades over a short time scale will
include the effects of actual information as well as implied information.  
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Harris (2002) notes that “spreads … should be widest for instruments that most
traders cannot easily value”, and also that traders are more likely to have useful
information about a given stock than a diversified portfolio of stocks.  Therefore, the
information content of trades in a diversified portfolio such as investment trust shares,
should be lower than for individual stocks.  If this is the case, we can test the suitability
of the price impact measure as a proxy for information asymmetry.
Research Design
We repeat the process from above, matching the investment trust shares with other FTSE
250 companies.  All of the investment trusts trade on SEAQ, and so the matched sample
also trades on SEAQ.  We chose the Price and Market Capitalization algorithm.  It was
easier to match stocks in this test, and so the maximum average deviation was reduced
from 0.75, as was the case in Venkataraman (2001), to 0.375.  The matched sample is
shown in Table 5.
Results
The motivation for this study is to examine the price impact for each sample, and
determine whether it is a useful measure of the information content of trades.   At first
glance we can see that the price impact is fairly low.  As before, the price impact
increases with size of trade.  The difference between samples also widens with size, up to
large trades, and then decreases again for very large trades.  This supports the use of price
impact as a measure of information asymmetry, but the weakness in the statistics
highlights the limitations for analysis in less liquid stocks like the FTSE 250.
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Equally significant is the differences in quoted and effective spread.  As we are
comparing stocks trading on the same platform, the quoted spread makes for a valid
comparison.  All measures are substantially lower for the investment trust sample.  This
may be due to the lower risk of informed traders.  If this is the case, then the effective
spread appears to be a stronger indicator than the measured price impact. 
CONCLUSION
There are several aspects to the design of a market.  Given the limited number of
comparable exchanges, it is difficult to evaluate the effect of just one aspect.
Comparisons of cross listed securities ignore the differences in the amount traded on each
market.  Comparisons of matched stocks on different markets ignore, the investor profile,
tax and information flow.  Comparisons of market opening with normal trading on the
same market are distorted by the time lags in information flow and quote revision.  The
comparison in this paper improves on all of these issues, by comparing different trading
platforms in the same country, in the same market, with the same investors and that trade
at the same time.  
The aim of this paper was to replicate the study by Venkataraman (2001) in a
different market and either support or dispute the previous conclusions.  Overall the
results contradict those of Venkataraman, showing that transaction costs on the limit
order book are higher than the dealer market.  Furthermore, the methodology and
assumption have been scrutinised.
We have shown that stocks switching from SEAQ to SETS experienced a drop in
liquidity.  This poses the question of why companies would wish to switch platforms,
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from SEAQ to SETS.  Perhaps the long term impact of switching platforms is a more
positive one. And this is an area for further research.
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Table 1: Breakdown of types of trade executed in each market
FTSE 250 SEAQ







52.75 87.42 Ordinary Trades 54.70 88.69
11.07 1.82 Protected Transactions 16.35 1.86
15.98 2.07 Single Protected Transaction 12.03 2.09
7.04 4.61 Market Maker to Market Maker 4.52 3.30
6.06 0.91 Cross at same price 6.56 0.76
4.85 2.69 Non Protected Portfolio 4.32 2.77
2.25 0.49 Other Trades 1.50 0.53
FTSE 250 SETS







18.22 31.20 Automatically Executed Trades 23.94 52.08
61.89 64.50 Ordinary Trades 58.07 44.18
9.22 0.89 Cross at same price 6.20 0.42
4.57 0.17 Worked Principal Trade 2.44 0.06
3.82 2.71 Non Protected Portfolio 5.05 1.41
1.38 0.15 Protected Portfolio 0.77 0.11
0.43 0.17 Volume Weighted Average Price 2.49 0.17
0.46 0.21 Other Trades 1.04 1.57
FTSE 100 SETS







27.31 53.26 Automatically Executed Trades 36.41 65.23
56.95 44.59 Ordinary Trades 47.88 30.95
3.56 0.29 Cross at same price 1.58 0.17
4.26 0.09 Worked Principal Trade 0.68 0.01
5.60 1.55 Non Protected Portfolio 3.57 0.75
1.22 0.05 Protected Portfolio 0.72 0.05
0.86 0.10 Volume Weighted Average Price 6.99 0.31
0.25 0.06 Other Trades 2.18 2.53
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Table 2: Matched Samples
Sample matched by price and market capitalization










Materials Basic Industries 2.3 1486.69 0.121 2.525 1281.07 AVIS EUROPE Transport C Services
BR.STEEL
Steel & other













Technology 16 2146.01 0.596 11.15 882.82 NAT.EXPRESS Transport C Services
ELECTROCO
MPS. Distribution C Services 3.935 1610.93 0.018 3.86 1585.41 AIRTOURS C Services
EMAP
Media &
Photography C Services 11.33 2128.53 0.222 11.625 1393.34
PENNON
















MEPC Real Estate Financials 4 1733.97 0.092 3.95 1459.31 FIRSTGROUP Transport C Services
NEXT
General
Retailers C Services 4.825 1673.63 0.174 3.71 1533.42 BBA GRP. Transport C Services



































































Sum 89.7275 14798.29 1.605 92.765 14368.9
  Average 3.9011957 643.403913 0.070 4.033261 624.7347826    
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Sample matched by price and trading volume
Stock Sub Sector Sector Price 
Trading
Volume Deviation Price Trading Volume Stock Sub sector Sector
BPB
ding &





metals Basic Industries 0.895 3.27053492 0.601 0.8775 0.841124999 AEGIS GRP.
Media &
Photography C Services








Technology 16 0.987446064 0.188 11.625 0.929927233
PENNON
GROUP Utilities Other Utilities
ELECTROCO
MPS. Distribution C Services 3.935 0.995467407 0.214 3.78 0.672449439 ARRIVA Transport C Services
EMAP
Media &






Goods 4.0875 1.845213228 0.080 3.71 1.733375261 BBA GRP. Transport C Services
LASMO ORD.
Oil Exploration &







Industries General Industries 3.25 0.614323893 0.103 3.49 0.703307395
BOWTHORP
E


























































Goods 3.4 0.855021038 0.062 3.475 0.771227843
HAMMERSO
N Real Estate Financials
TI GRP.
Engineering &
















Building Materials Basic Industries 3.7 1.290995809 0.039 3.95 1.274752853
FIRSTGROU




Building Materials Basic Industries 3.1 1.987107112 0.142 3.86 2.12276373 AIRTOURS C Services
BURMAH
CAST. Oil & Gas Resources 8.77 0.885525522 0.167 11.15 0.805694851
NAT.EXPRES














Production Resources 3.05 1.779422415 0.390 2.83 0.851649447
ASS.BR.POR









sum 153.7275 36.13438712 5.601 125.8325 26.83554357
  average 5.9125962 1.38978412 0.215 4.839712 1.032136291    
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MPS. Distribution C Services 3.935 1610.93 0.018 3.86 1585.41 AIRTOURS C Services
EMAP
Media &

















MEPC Real Estate Financials 4 1733.97 0.271 3.475 1154.24 HAMMERSON Real Estate Financials
NEXT
General
Retailers C Services 4.825 1673.63 0.175 4.795 1183.71 SMITH(WH)GRP. General Retailers C Services









































































sum 73.0425 33487.48 8.110 58.3725 21554.78
  average 4.0579167 1860.415556 0.451 3.242917 1197.487778    
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Sample matched by industry, price and trading volume






















MPS. Distribution C Services 3.935 0.995467407 0.125 3.95 1.274752853 FIRSTGROUP Transport C Services
EMAP
Media &









Production Resources 1.035 1.803715584 0.483 1 0.657741832 BR.BORNEO OIL Oil & Gas Resources
LONRHO
Diversified





MEPC Real Estate Financials 4 0.832739705 0.109 3.475 0.771227843 HAMMERSON Real Estate Financials
NEXT General Retailers C Services 4.825 2.808143842 0.330 4.795 1.424812627 SMITH(WH)GRP. General Retailers C Services













































































Goods 6.3 2.860974176 0.734 5.66 0.544573592 ALLIANCE UNICHM Health
NC Consumer
Goods
sum 125.9075 32.48199312 9.555 103.68 17.78095665
  average 5.4742391 1.41226057 0.415 4.507826 0.773085072    
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Table 3: Transaction cost measures, broken down by size of trade

















SETS SEAQ diff SETS SEAQ diff SETS SEAQ diff SETS SEAQ diff
                  
Quoted
Spread OVERALL 84.11 139.81 55.70 84.42 134.41 49.99 84.64 165.27 80.63 82.25 149.50 67.25
Effective
Spread very small 95.69 104.52 8.83 98.04 102.76 4.72 97.39 125.69 28.30 96.39 111.57 15.18
small 88.74 99.40 10.66 89.58 99.31 9.73 88.23 122.75 34.51 89.30 107.04 17.74
medium 90.00 95.15 5.15 90.86 96.05 5.19 84.35 117.62 33.28 90.28 103.39 13.11
large 82.91 87.10 4.19 82.49 87.52 5.03 78.99 106.32 27.34 82.76 95.61 12.85
very large 81.61 52.28 -29.34 81.13 51.80 -29.33 80.49 60.01 -20.48 80.90 55.98 -24.92
OVERALL 81.85 89.76 7.91 80.80 88.28 7.48 78.34 109.43 31.09 80.47 97.94 17.47
Price
Impact very small 14.83 -19.02 -33.85 12.13 -14.66 -26.79 12.61 4.74 -7.87 9.17 5.66 -3.51
small 24.50 -24.17 -48.68 26.35 -18.57 -44.91 27.54 8.51 -19.03 26.52 6.44 -20.08
medium 25.40 11.85 -13.55 -139.7 13.08 152.74 -223.3 -125.77 97.54 -161.6 12.20 173.83
large 39.72 67.84 28.12 82.50 60.97 -21.53 112.68 32.65 -80.03 88.82 28.14 -60.69
very large 47.13 22.58 -24.55 45.95 23.60 -22.35 50.88 25.24 -25.64 46.96 24.64 -22.32
OVERALL 34.19 8.45 -25.75 34.08 10.87 -23.21 39.78 0.81 -38.98 33.74 15.96 -17.78
Realized
Spread very small 68.08 123.54 55.46 72.53 117.42 44.89 74.60 120.95 46.35 76.23 105.91 29.68
small 50.83 123.58 72.74 50.13 117.87 67.74 49.74 114.24 64.49 51.00 100.60 49.60
medium 41.15 83.31 42.16 208.9 82.97 -125.91 295.7 243.39 -52.26 230.4 91.19 -139.19
large 18.96 19.26 0.30 -22.9 26.54 49.48 -47.68 73.67 121.4 -29.38 67.48 96.75
very large 11.54 29.70 18.15 12.49 28.20 15.71 12.22 34.77 22.55 12.61 31.34 18.73
OVERALL 25.77 81.31 55.54 26.12 77.42 51.30 25.73 108.62 82.89 26.47 81.98 55.51
 
                 
Data set includes all trades between 1/9/98 and 1/9/99.  Trades were excluded if reported late or if the trade price was outside of the spread by more
than 10%. Trading volume was averaged over the year.  Price and market cap figures were taken as at 1/9/98.  Industry specific stocks were matched
by sub sector if possible, and by sector if not. Duplicates were removed (keeping the pair with the lowest "average deviation").  Figures are quoted in
basis points.
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Platform Quoted Spread Effective Spread Price Impact Realized Spread
             
             
SETS SETS 83.53 84.04 79.31 72.98 31.91 31.73 79.31 72.98
OVERALL SEAQ SETS 141.75 174.84 95.91 103.82 8.74 12.51 95.91 103.82
SEAQ SEAQ 161.48 166.06 107.75 106.87 14.73 15.55 107.75 106.87
SETS SETS 97.50 85.78 9.04 8.16 73.88 62.06
Very Small SEAQ SETS 110.05 126.88 -17.49 4.09 127.55 122.79
SEAQ SEAQ 125.26 122.97 5.22 3.89 120.04 119.09
SETS SETS 88.30 76.03 25.85 25.03 49.11 37.05
Small SEAQ SETS 105.72 117.67 -23.67 12.76 129.39 104.91
SEAQ SEAQ 121.19 119.45 8.30 6.33 112.89 112.87
SETS SETS 90.32 76.22 -149.25 23.77 216.21 36.84
Medium SEAQ SETS 99.65 108.15 12.24 13.33 87.41 94.82
SEAQ SEAQ 115.69 116.31 -4.38 13.55 120.07 102.76
SETS SETS 81.54 72.24 82.37 35.96 -24.81 17.74
Large SEAQ SETS 91.25 84.12 66.40 19.45 24.84 64.67
SEAQ SEAQ 105.02 107.56 33.38 28.56 71.64 79.00
SETS SETS 79.15 70.39 44.14 37.22 12.12 10.95
Very Large SEAQ SETS 55.65 31.83 25.27 12.40 30.37 19.43
SEAQ SEAQ 64.06 58.55 20.49 19.12 43.56 39.43
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Capitalization Name Sub sector Sector
BANKERS INV.TST 2.39 2018.37 0.110 2.79 1891.25 MORRISON (WM)
Food & Drug
Retailers NC Services
CALEDONIA INV. 7.65 617.16 0.137 8.375 742 SETON SCHOLL Health
NC Consumer
Goods




EDIN.INV.TST. 4.43 1181.14 0.041 4.795 1183.71 SMITH(WH)GRP. General Retailers C Services
EDIN.US TRACKER 5.485 370.97 0.087 5.205 328.56 SPIRAX-SARCO
Engineering &
Machinery General Industries
ELECTRA INV.TST 5.48 933.87 0.038 5.525 1000.13 CAPITA GROUP Support Services C Services
FLEM.AMER.I.T. 6.075 362.09 0.104 7.29 352.41 VIRIDIAN GRP. Electricity Utilities
FLEM.O'SEAS 4.005 448.33 0.065 3.97 397.02 TRAVIS PERKINS
Construction &
Building Materials Basic Industries
FLEMING CONTL. 5.935 345 0.013 5.8 345.95 PSION
Electronic &
Electrical Equipment General Industries
FLEMING MERCTLE 3.175 456.65 0.051 3.285 488.47 F.I.GROUP Support Services C Services
FOR.&COL.IV.TST 1.8775 1679.05 0.282 2.525 1281.07 AVIS EUROPE Transport C Services
GOVETT STRAT.IT 3.71 340.61 0.023 3.66 351.94 MCKECHNIE
Aerospace &
Defence General Industries
HEND.SMALL COS. 2.265 373.33 0.019 2.32 368.18 BARRATT DEVEL.
Construction &
Building Materials Basic Industries
INVEST.CAP.GWTH 1.7 353.78 0.031 1.605 355.56 HEPWORTH
Construction &
Building Materials Basic Industries
MERC.EURO.PRIV. 1.465 610.79 0.061 1.38 573.43 ASHTEAD GRP.
Construction &
Building Materials Basic Industries
MERCHANTS TST 4.11 344.34 0.137 4.635 295.1 RM Support Services C Services
MURRAY INC.TST. 4.585 344.59 0.047 4.66 372.21
POWELL
DUFFRYN Diversified Industries General Industries
MURRAY INTL.TST 4.35 450.73 0.077 3.825 462.54 LEX SERVICE
RIT CAPITAL 3.295 540.42 0.032 3.26 512.8 CHARTER
Engineering &
Machinery General Industries
SCOT.AMER.INV. 2.1 416.47 0.021 2.125 404 CRODA INTL. Chemicals Basic Industries
SCOT.INV.TST. 3.605 860.25 0.051 3.495 801.51 MAN(ED&F)
Speciality & Other
Finance Financials
SCOT.MORTGAGE 3.58 1092.98 0.042 3.475 1154.24 HAMMERSON Real Estate Financials
WITAN INV. 3.655 332.9 0.088 3.59 389.72 ST.IVES
Media &
Photography C Services
89.728 14798.29 1.605 92.765 14368.9
 3.9012 643.403913 0.070 4.033261 624.7347826    
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Table 6: Trading cost measures for investment trusts and matched companies
 






     
Quoted Spread OVERALL 70.67 156.66 85.98
  
Effective Spread very small 62.39 117.42 55.03
small 58.26 114.50 56.24
medium 55.84 111.16 55.32
large 52.81 103.66 50.85
very large 44.36 57.89 13.54
OVERALL 54.93 100.55 45.62
  
Price Impact very small 1.99 5.52 3.53
small 1.76 10.93 9.17
medium 2.30 18.14 15.84
large 6.43 39.46 33.04
very large 11.76 23.05 11.29
OVERALL 3.83 20.38 16.55
  
Realized Spread very small 60.40 111.90 51.50
small 56.49 103.57 47.08
medium 53.53 93.02 39.48
large 46.38 64.20 17.81
very large 32.60 34.84 2.25
OVERALL 51.10 80.17 29.07
     
Data set includes all trades between 1/9/98 and 1/9/99.  Trades were excluded if reported late or if the
trade price was outside of the spread by more than 10%.  Price and Market Capitalization figures were
taken as at 1/9/98.  Investment trust stocks were matched against other stocks by Market Capitalization
and Price.  Pairs were excluded if the average deviation was greater than 0.375.  Figures are quoted in
basis points.
